Here’s an interesting question I came across a few weeks ago:
Do Christians have to adopt an irrational position in order to believe in Jesus? Isn’t it irrational to believe that God exists, that Jesus was God, that he was risen from the dead, etc.?
What do you think? In order to believe the claims of Christianity, does one have to set aside reason?
Any thoughts?
Traditionally, Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes associated reason with empirical observation. If one cannot observe and measure evidence, it is not real knowledge. So, yes...any belief in a supernatural power requires individuals to "set aside reason."
ReplyDeleteI want to sincerely thank you for your comment.
ReplyDeleteThe "traditional" distinction between faith and reason does seem to primarily concern the distinction between empiricism (i.e. what can be observed with our senses) and the grand notions of things that cannot be directly observed (i.e. God, the soul, etc.).
Christianity, however, does not merely ask one to believe in some etherial being, but to believe in a person, Jesus, and to believe what was written about him by his followers who claim to have observed and measured the evidence of his life through the gospel narratives. How might this aspect of Christianity problematize the claims of Enlightenment rationalism; or do you think it might at all? Or perhaps someone else may have something to add at this point...?
Ben Franklin wrote that "the way to see by faith is to shut the eye of reason." What I am trying to suggest is not critiquing Christianity on the basis of reason. Many have already done so ad nauseum including Locke, Hume (whom I might suggest over Hobbs), and the rest of the post-Enlightenment thinkers. No, what I suggest is that we instead critique reason by what we traditionally have called "faith." I am positing that we have dogmatically believed, with little process of rationality on our own, that the Enlightenment thinkers were right simply because we have been trained to do so, and that we have simply accepted Franklin's aphorism as true without even attempting to provide any evidence to the contrary.
ReplyDelete(Warrant: How many of us who believe evolution to be the case have actually read and ourselves reasoned through the works of Darwin? How many of us who believe in the fundamental right to owning personal property have actually read and reasoned through anything by Locke? How many of us who believe the Egyptian protestors are doing the right thing have ever read and reasoned through Hegel? de Tocqueville? J.S. Mill? How many beliefs do we hold that we have never sat down and actually thought through ourselves? It seems we are more likely inclined to accept the beliefs as handed down to us from high school teachers and college professors we once had, which to me sounds more like Medieval Christianity than anything I have seen in the Christian church in our present time).
What reason do we have for suggesting that the apostles including Paul were irrational in the sense that they "set aside reason" for faith? What reasons do we have for suggesting that there is any distinction at all between reason and the faith they had in the person they knew as Jesus?
I am frankly shocked no one has anything to write on this subject. Are we okay with the belief that faith in Jesus is irrational? Must I set aside reason, understanding, knowledge, in order to believe the claims of Jesus? Can I then have absolutely no certain knowledge that Jesus was in fact the Christ (that he was the son of God, died, was buried, and miraculously came back to life three days later)?
Hi Anonymous,
ReplyDeleteI also appreciate your response. I would like to share an observation as it relates to your comment.
"Locke and Hobbes associated reason with empirical observation"
I believe you mean these ideas were to be taken as synonymous and/or interchangeable with each other. By that, from the rest of your comments I think you mean, 'Reason is that which can be empirically observed' which leads to 'Reason IS real knowledge.'
Let us define Reason as, 'the process of the mind to think, understand and form judgements by the process of logic (laws of logic)'
and Empirical Observation as, 'that which is based or concerned with verifiable sense(s) observation or experience rather than theory or pure logic.'
I know it's not a thorough or exhaustive set of definitions, but I think you would agree that it gets to the intention of the words.
If you claim that 'everything is ultimately known and reasonable via this empirical observation. i.e your premise, 'reason is synonymous with empirical observation'. Then I can see how you could believe "if one cannot observe and measure evidence, it is not real [or accurate] knowledge [about reality]." I assume you generally mean natural/physical/material/forensic evidence and processes. It also appears that by knowledge you mean a certain point of real, reality or truth. I sense you believe everything is ultimately explicable within the confines of natural explanations/processes. If this is not what you mean I would like to know.
My concern with your (or at least Locke and Hobbes) premise is that it is not sound from the start.
If it's true that if one cannot observe and measure evidence, it is not real knowledge, then I believe I would have to agree with you. It probably would be quite irrational to believe that anything that is not, as a matter of necessity, subject to such normal empirical observations, experimentations and processes, no real knowledge could exist. I think this is what you affirm is not possible, that being, the testing for the supernatural, God, souls, etc. However, this is where I believe your critique is weak. I would like to know how you use empirical observations / processes to affirm my paraphrase of your claim -
"*all reasonable and true knowledge worth believing is associated with empirical observation".
Or to put it another way, what empirical method(s) do you use in order to substantiate your claim* empirically?
If all knowledge is ultimately subject to the methods of empiricism, how do you substantiate *THAT claim of knowledge, empirically?
How do you experience it, experiment with it, measure it, or observe it empirically?
I think you may find that hard to do. Many modern philosophers have recognized this is a logical contradiction. This is known as the problem of Verificationism.
The conflict I see with this comment lies at the root of the meaning of the words you are using. I feel you are not using your own standard consistently.
So I would respectfully disagree with your conclusion that, "any belief in a supernatural power requires individuals to "set aside reason." Because it seems to me that the premise upon which your objection is built is not logically sound, so the conclusion that follows from the premise is not sound. So lets not 'shut the eye of reason' and lets discuss this further. Thanks!
Jesse, Clint, et al.
ReplyDeleteI'm a bit late to this, but perhaps I can get the conversation going again.
Let's assume that Plantinga's attack on evidentialism, as outlined quite well in Jesse's post, is successful, and therefore the core principle of evidentialism is self-referentially incoherent. What follows from that? It certainly does not follow that religious beliefs are rational. In fact, all we get from this argument is a lacuna in our understanding of what it means to be rational. So we'll have to approach the problem from a different angle. My preference, being inclined to naturalistic methods, is to start from the bottom rather than the top. Instead of starting with a general principle of rational belief, I'll instead ask a much smaller question: How ought agents decide what to believe? Now, I'm going to make some controversial assumptions just to get this up and going, but if anyone disagrees with these, then feel free to suggest alternatives. Since the question is (apparently) a question of epistemic normativity, then I'll assume it's fair to accept the traditional epistemic values of having true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. (A true belief, for my purposes, is just one whose content accurately denotes something that exists. A false one, then, is one that fails to do so.) These values do come into tension since if we accept criteria for belief that are too conservative, we will have few false beliefs but also few beliefs overall, but if our criteria are too liberal, then we will get lots of true beliefs but also many false ones. The way forward then, is to find criteria for belief which allow us to maintain a minimal level of reliability but also to function efficiently in the world. At this point in the project, patterns of belief acquisition that conform largely to the principle of verification look pretty attractive to me. Acquiring beliefs in this way allows me to accept what I can't help but accept (the obvious and undefeated deliverances of my senses), and it also gives me a clear cut procedure by which I can disqualify beliefs which seem more dangerous (i.e. more likely to be false). Dangerous beliefs of this sort include both beliefs that seem to conflict with previously verified beliefs, beliefs whose content has yet to be verified (verification is a thin concept on this picture, as such, I might better have used a less loaded term such as substantiated or supported), and beliefs whose content cannot possibly be verified. Now, before I'm accused of begging the question against religious belief, let me add that this method does not assume the falsity of religious beliefs. It instead sets the same standard for believing religious content that it sets for believing naturalistic content. So, I've offered a rough method for belief acquisition that seems to lead, at minimum, to doubt regarding many religious beliefs. I employed no general principles, but instead sketched a procedure. The procedure might be criticized on the basis of how well it serves the established ends, but it can't be accused of incoherence since it makes no positive general claims.
So, how might a religious person modify that procedure in a way that does no damage to its epistemic reliability but allows for the acceptance of a broad section of religious beliefs?
By way of summary, the initial question was whether or not one should set aside reason or rationality in order to hold the core beliefs of Christianity. An anonymous commenter wrote that, thanks to the work of Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke and Hobbes, it seems irrational to believe anything which cannot be verified through sense-experience (a belief commonly known as empiricism); therefore, it seems irrational to believe in God, the resurrection, and many of the core beliefs of Christianity.
ReplyDeleteJesse responded to this comment by revealing the fact that any claim of knowledge on the basis of sense-experience cannot itself be verified empirically. I.e. if I were to say that all I can know is that which can be verified by sense-experience, the very claim "all I can know is that which can be verified by sense-experience" cannot itself be verified by sense-experience. Therefore, the entire foundation of an empirical claim to knowledge such as this cannot hold up to its own claims. We call this a "self-referentially incoherent," and therefore false, claim to knowledge.
Cheek responded by showing that Jesse's critique (a la Plantinga) may not extend far enough to show that religious beliefs are rational, but only that knowledge claims on the basis of empirical verification fall short of a complete rational system which can then be used to exclude the claims of Christianity from itself. Cheek proposes instead of trying to create a complete definition of rationality, we might begin with the individual who attempts to reason through his/her own beliefs. Rather than worrying about what constitutes a "rational" belief, one ought to consider what one experiences and whether or not the beliefs one holds match up well with those experiences or not. Cheek leaves us with an open question as to whether or how a religious person might use a similar procedure in order to hold both "epistemic reliability" in one's beliefs and "religious beliefs" which do not prima facia seem to be epistemically reliable.
Please correct me if I have in any way provided an unjust summary of your responses.
Pardon the misspelling: "prima facia" should be "prima facie" and means literally "at first sight."
ReplyDeleteHi cheek,
ReplyDeleteThanks for your thoughts. It is important to examine the issue you bring up as it relates to, "how do we know what we know". Or how you put it, "How ought agents decide what to believe?" This may be more of a methodological question than an epistemological, but I think both are important to this matter. Creating a foundation upon which to build our perspectives is very important to clear and meaningful discussion. So, I need some clarification on some of the issues you brought up. I'll provide your quotes with my response and again I would appreciate your thoughts.
"it certainly does not follow that religious beliefs are rational"
- This statement requires further explanation. Which religious beliefs, from your perspective, seem to require an irrational or non-rational adherence to and why? (You are welcome to bring up any of the ones mentioned by Clint) As I'm sure you know, not all religions make the same 'kinds' of religious claims. So comparing religions may have some relevance here. If you want to discuss those feel free.
"having true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs"
- Do you believe there are objective truths and/or subjective truths that exist? Which one(s) do you think these issues categorically fall under?
"naturalistic methods"
- What do you mean by this?
"The way forward then, is to find criteria for belief which allow us to maintain a minimal level of reliability, but also to function efficiently in the world."
- What are the some "bare essentials' to maintain minimal reliability? What are some ways you think "functioning efficiently" in the world looks like? It seems, from your perspective, there are 'Dangerous beliefs' that exist, likewise it implies that you believe there is an opposite set of 'Safe beliefs', what are some of those?
"At this point in the project, patterns of belief acquisition that conform largely to the principle of verification look pretty attractive to me.
... (the obvious and undefeated deliverances of my senses)"
- As you point out verification may be a bit of a loaded term here, but I think that the general reliability of sense perception is a rational and reasonable claim. However, I think you see the conundrum from my last posting about the self-defeating nature of evidentialism/verificationism. So, to avoid equivocating I would need you to unpack your use of these terms.
"...this method does not assume the falsity of religious beliefs....it makes no positive general claims."
- Do you think that there is neutrality in this discussion between religious claims and naturalistic claims? By that, I mean do you think they coexist without objectively violating the other's claims upon reality?
I think that the general reliability of sense perception, laws of logic, and historical forensics are some of the 'tools' Christians use in order to handle the claims of the Bible. Thanks again.
In saying that the rationality of religious belief does not follow from the self-referential incoherence of evidentialism, I merely meant to point out that the argument is a purely deconstructive one. Showing the rationality of religious beliefs (whatever they are) would require a competing theory of rationality (something like Plantinga's more inclusive foundationalism). All that I meant to convey then, is that the deconstruction only starts the process of deciding what is rational; it doesn't decide the point in favor of the religious believer. As for what I mean when I say 'religious belief' I'm being intentionally vague, but I largely mean beliefs like the ones Clint listed. I do not mean every belief that religious people hold as members of their respective religions. Rather I mean the beliefs (almost always non-verifiable) that people hold because of their respective religions and which they would not hold were they not attached to a religious tradition.
ReplyDeleteAs for the objective/subjective belief dichotomy, I'm going to need some clarification too I guess. I understand truth to mean roughly the conformity of content to reality. In that sense, if there is only one reality, then there can only be one truth. Subjective truths then, would merely be truths the content of which concerns the mental states of individual subjects. Is this what you had in mind?
By 'naturalistic methods' I mean methodological naturalism, which I don't take to pre-suppose ontological naturalism. This gets to what you said in your first paragraph suggesting a distinction between epistemic and methodological questions. I suppose I would deny such a distinction is useful. I am an epistemic naturalist in that I think everything that is useful about the sub-discipline of epistemology will be directed at understanding which epistemic methods are useful. As such, I am almost completely disinterested in classical questions of knowledge and justification. However, I'm conversant in the various answers to those questions, so if you prefer to frame the discussion that way, I suppose I could try. The only reservation I would have is to ask why justification/warrant/knowledge matter on any given theory, that is, how do they help agents succeed in acquiring the types of beliefs that they want.
cont'd
'Minimal reliability': again, this is an intentionally vague term, left so to avoid useless quibbling over where exactly to draw the line. Think of it as a spectrum with completely unsafe beliefs on the left and completely safe beliefs on the right. The further right a belief or type of belief falls on the spectrum, the more likely it is to be true, the more reliable it is.
ReplyDeleteThis leads into your next question about 'verification'. Let me be clear, I am not arguing in favor of the a priori Principle of Verification a la Roderick Chisolm. Think of it this way. We all acquire beliefs in various ways: sense perception, testimony, inference, etc. Some methods of belief formation are better than others when it comes to acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones. So, trusting my senses is probably more reliable prima facie than trusting palm readers. Now, in the same way, I think it's pretty clear that beliefs formed in a way that conforms to some weak form of verificationism are more reliable than unverified beliefs. (In fact, I think that is the reason why sense perception is more reliable than palm-reading, but that's not an essential piece of my view.)
Finally, regarding neutrality, I'm not sure what to say. I simply propose a method, one which most of us follow more or less in our daily lives. This does not pre-suppose the truth or falsity of any claims. It might turn out to be harder (and in fact I think it does turn out so) to support religious claims via this method, but surely that is not a mark against the method unless you are presupposing the truth of such claims. Further to this end, the method is not foundationalist in structure. So you can combine it with other methods, and if fact I think we do just that. We have varying standards for belief depending on the importance of the beliefs to our actions and desires.
To this point, all I have suggested is that verification turns out to be an efficient tool for belief-formation (a claim which no one could reasonably deny). I did not mean to imply that verification is the only epistemic tool agent's are allowed to use. If there are others that achieve good results, then of course they are fair game as well. How would you suggest we augment the method as I've developed it so far?
Well, snot. I tried to cut it in half, but I lost the first half. Let me try to summarize it quickly before my baby boy wakes up.
ReplyDeleteThe deconstruction of evidentialism as the foundation of rational belief does not show religious belief to be rational because it does not show anything to be rational. It merely forces us to choose different criteria for rationality. It is that type of positive project that I tried to start in my original post.
I understand truth to be the conformity of content to reality. If there is only one reality, then there is only one truth. Subjective truth then is merely truth the the content of which regards the internal mental states of particular subjects. I'm actually not sure why you think this distinction matters, but perhaps that answers your question sufficiently?
Finally, I believe methodological naturalism to be the only really useful part of the sub-discipline of epistemology. The distinction you suggest between epistemological and methodological questions in your opening paragraph is then not one I would endorse. This method, however, does not pre-suppose any facts. Particularly, it does not pre-suppose ontological naturalism. Instead, it suggests that questions of knowledge, justification, et al. are useful only insofar as they ground the value of these concepts in their utility for people in the world. As such, it is not enough to say that a belief is justified. A useful theory must also say why that matters (i.e. because justified beliefs are more likely to help agents fulfill their desires).
That's just a quick summary of what I'd written before, but hopefully it makes sense.
cheek,
ReplyDeletePlease pardon the delay in my response. Thank you for your clarifications and answers. It may be helpful to write out your postings on a separate word application, because I have lost things before that way when a blog site malfunctions.
Getting back to the matter of your original posting, you are concerned with how do agents decide what to believe, from what I am gathering, the essentials of your perspective are among the following:
1. Verificationism is self-referentially incoherent and therefore irrational.
2. Your own epistemic methods does not pre-suppose any facts. Particularly, it does not pre-suppose ontological naturalism.
3. ...evidentialism as the foundation of rational belief does not show religious belief to be rational because it does not show anything to be rational. It merely forces us to choose different criteria for rationality.
4. Some methods of belief formation are better than others when it comes to acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false ones.
You believe methodological naturalism (scientific method) to be the only really useful part of the sub-discipline of epistemology.
5. ...suggests that questions of knowledge, justification,... are useful only insofar as they ground the value of these concepts in their utility for people in the world.
6. ... justified beliefs are more likely to help agents fulfill their desires.
Let me know if this is a fair summary, I don't want to misrepresent anything.
To address your confusion about objective/subjective truth dichotomy. I was asking do you believe that there is such a thing as objective truth. That is, things that all people, at all times, everywhere 'know' with only slight and ultimately trivial variation or are the things we know limited only to ones own personal subjective experiences, preferences or opinions.
At points 5 & 6 you bring in a new concept. Do you believe Utilitarian principles are useful in your epistemic method? For example i've read some articles on new ethical paradigms like Desire Utilitarianism, would you say Utilitarianism play a part in your epistemological criteria? If so, how would you say they relate to Methodological Naturalism (MN)? If MN does not directly lead to or affirms Ontological Naturalism (by that I mean it does not, at the start, rule out supernatural phenomenon existing because there is by definition nothing beyond the 'natural'). My question would lead to, what are your perceived problems or examples of religious teaching of claims that you might put forward as being irrational as your epistemology encounters these matters? On another point how would you say MN is justified by MN processes without being restrained by the same logical binds similar to the Verification problem? Here is, perhaps, a good illustration of the dilemma I am talking about. The respective comments start around 6:58 - 8:45, begin around 1:15 to understand the context.
excerpt - "What is the Evidence for the Exsitence of God? - Dr. William Lane Craig vs Dr. Peter Atkins, 1998"
I'd like to get your thoughts on some of these ideas, feel free to respond when you can. Thanks for dialoguing with us, I hope you can come out to the Question Group coming up April 6th.
Link below
ReplyDeleteexcerpt - "What is the Evidence for the Exsitence of God? - Dr. William Lane Craig vs Dr. Peter Atkins, 1998"
< www(dot)youtube(dot)com/watch?v=h6Ycav742jI >